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I. INTRODUCTION
The global threats of infectious disease and bioterrorism are of great concern
to the scientific community and the general public.' Although recent legislative
and executive initiatives have attempted to address the risks posed by
bioterrorism2 and the outbreak of an infectious disease, such as an influenza
pandemic,3 the mere allocation of financial resources by the federal government
represents only an initial step in promoting research endeavors directed at these
formidable health issues. In fact, the exclusivity associated with patents and the
underlying principles of intellectual property law present the greatest obstacles to
innovative biomedical research.4 The Supreme Court's decision in Merck KGaA
v. Integra LDfeSdences I, Ltd. represents the judiciary's most recent attempt to
balance the property rights embodied in a patent against the availability of
technology.' By providing legal access to technology, the Merck KGaA decision
should encourage investment in research and development and thus expedite the
discovery of novel drugs and therapeutics aimed at combating the threats of
bioterrorism and the spread of infectious disease.
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents exemplify the competing notions
of intellectual property law: the social benefits of providing economic incentives
for biomedical discovery opposed by the social costs of limiting the dissemination
of scientific knowledge.6  The Patent Act provides pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies with the right to patent the fruits of their research and
labor, which usually takes the form of innovative drugs.' Pharmaceutical patents
grant a monopoly to the patent holder, preventing others from making, using,
importing, or selling the patented invention in the United States.' Consequently,
the patent provides its holder with exclusive access to the marketplace for a life-
saving drug, allowing for the recovery of costs related to drug discovery.9
Lawrence K. Altman, What is the Next Plague?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at F8.
2 William H. Frist, M.D., U.S. Senate Majority Leader, Lecture at the Nantucket Atheneum:
The Manhattan Project for the 21st Century (Aug. 3,2005), available athttp://frist.senate.gov/index.
c fm?FuseAction=Speeches.Detail&Speech-id=261.
' President George W. Bush, Address at the William Natcher Center of the National Institutes
of Health (Nov. 1, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/
20051101-1.html.
4 Norman G. Anderson & N. Leigh Anderson, A Manhattan Projectfor Biotermrism, SCIENTIST,
July 4, 2005, at 10.
s Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
6 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
13 (3d ed. 2003).
1 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
8 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
9 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS
[Vol. 13:375
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In an effort to encourage drug development and to expedite the introduction
of pharmaceuticals into the marketplace, Congress amended the patent laws
through enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. °  The Hatch-Waxman Act
effectively insulated pharmaceutical research from patent infringement, providing
that research utilizing a patented product is "solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."" Section 202 of the Act,
codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), 2 has become known as the safe harbor
provision against patent infringement because it renders activities that would
ordinarily constitute patent infringement non-infringing if performed for the
purpose of gaining regulatory approval from the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) for a novel human or veterinary drug product, medical device, or food
additive. 3
Courts have struggled to define the scope of the safe harbor provision. 4
Recently, a unanimous Supreme Court in Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSdences I, Ltd.
broadly interpreted the safe harbor created by the research exemption of the
Hatch-Waxman Act.'- The Supreme Court, in evaluating the phrase "solely for
uses reasonably related to" overruled the interpretation adopted by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit 6 and determined that § 271(e)(1)'s research
exemption extended to all uses of patented inventions when the research was
conducted in a manner reasonably related to the submission of any information
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 33 (uly 1998).
10 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(1), at 14,15,20 (1984), rprntedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,2648,2653.
n Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603.
12 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) (2000). This section states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than
a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is
primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma
technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation
techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale
of drugs or veterinary biological products.
Id.
13 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
14 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., Inc., 1988 WL 22602, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1562, 1565 (D. Del. Mar. 9, 1988) ("The scope of section 271 (e)(1) presents a
question of law that has no clear answer.").
t See Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
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required by the FDA's regulatory process. 7 Based on this interpretation, the
research exemption applies equally to clinical trials as well as to preclinical
research." The Court justified this position as an investigational new drug
application (IND) must be submitted to the FDA to gain authorization to
conduct clinical trials,' 9 and an IND must sufficiently describe preclinical data to
gain such authorization.2" Considering the trials and errors associated with
biomedical research, the Supreme Court in Merck KGaA further construed the
research exemption to embrace "experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately
the subject of an FDA submission or [the] use of patented compounds in
experiments that are not ultimately submitted to the FDA."'" Accordingly, the
Court held that Merck's use of Integra's patented invention was encompassed by
the research exemption of S 271(e)(1) because Merck's preclinical biomedical
research was designed to identify novel drug candidates, which could reasonably
be the subject of an IND application to the FDA.22
By adopting a broad interpretation of the safe harbor, this Court distilled
Congress' intent from the statutory text of the Hatch-Waxman Act' and its
implicit preference for a policy favoring the availability of technology for the
public's benefit as opposed to the patentee's interest in protecting property rights
in the patent.24 Application of the safe harbor to all uses of patented compounds
reasonably related to the process of developing a drug in accordance with any
federal law 2' is consistent with promoting drug development activities that could
potentially benefit human health by accelerating the entry of novel, innovative
drugs into the marketplace. 26  A broad safe harbor will permit biomedical
researchers to immediately pursue a promising drug and perform the necessary
experiments to gain regulatory approval so that the drug may reach patients as
soon as possible upon expiration of the underlying patents.2' Although the safe
harbor restricts a patentee's right to exclude others from his patented invention,
17 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2380.
IS Id.
19 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(1) (West 2003).
-o Id. § 355(i)(1)(A).
21 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382-83.
" Id. at 2383-84.
23 Id. at 2380.
24 Id. at 2383.
25 Id.
2 Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit at 12, Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237),
available at 2004 WL 406591; Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Merck
KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), available at 2004 WL
2851214.
27 Tony Mauro, Justices Hand Drug Researchers Big Victory, LEGAL TIMEs, June 20, 2005, at 12.
[Vol. 13:375
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the public welfare is benefited by early access to the patented invention, which
will expedite the availability of novel pharmaceuticals."
Interpretation of the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) in a manner consistent with
maximizing the benefit of the general welfare suggests that scientific knowledge
can be considered a public good. Public goods, characterized by ideas and
knowledge, are freely available to all and are not diminished by use.29 Scientific
knowledge is more appropriately viewed as an impure public good because
intellectual property law regimes commonly restrict access; however, the broad
interpretation of the safe harbor by the Merck KGaA Court curtails such
restrictions, making available patented technology for developmental research
reasonably related to securing regulatory approval.' Treatment of scientific
knowledge as a public good is not a novel concept suggested by the Merck KGaA
Court. Rather, numerous entities engaged in scientific research have realized the
importance of moving scientific discovery into the public domain.3" For instance,
Celera Genomics, the biotechnology company credited with sequencing the
human genome, has recently decided to place its database in the public domain.32
The University of California, Berkeley has pioneered a "socially responsible
licensing program" which provides technologies that promise exceptional benefit
to the developing world, such as effective anti-malaria therapeutics, on a royalty-
free basis.33 Several other universities have adopted similar programs to transfer
intellectual property rights to non-traditional pharmaceutical ventures in an effort
to advance so-called "neglected disease" research. 4 Furthermore, a number of
preclinical development projects have emerged,3" particularly open-source
initiatives designed to pool research resources to speed commercialization of
pharmaceuticals, such as the Tropical Disease Initiative36 and the Biological
Innovation for Open Society.
37
Although donation of intellectual propertyto the public domain through non-
traditional pharmaceutical ventures, such as non-profit research organizations,
represents a noble beginning to the dissemination of the public good that is
28 Brief for the Petitioner, Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005)
(No. 03-1237), available at 2004 WL 406591.
2 Dana G. Dalrymple, Scientific Knowedge as a Pub'c Good, SCIENTIST, June 20, 2005, at 10.
0 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005).
31 Dalrymple, supra note 29, at 10.
32 Andrew Pollack, Ce/era to.Quit Selng Genome Information, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at C2.
3 Bennett Daviss, Malaria, Science, and Social Responsibity, SCIENTIST, Mar. 28, 2005, at 42.
' Dave A. Chokshi, Universities Should Foster Neglected Disease Work, NATURE, May 12, 2005, at
143.
35 Id.
36 Tropical Disease Initiative, http://www.tropicaldisease.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
3' Biological Innovation for Open Society, http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/1093.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2006).
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scientific knowledge, the model is flawed. First, technology voluntarily placed in
the public domain is usually not commercially viable, which generally means that
the technology has little if any practical benefit.3" Second, non-traditional
pharmaceutical ventures offer no economic incentive for participation; these
organizations rely solely upon a patent holder's donative intent.39 Third, unlike
academic and government entities, non-profit research organizations lack the
resources to further develop patented technologies.
40
Based on the shortcomings of relying solely upon a non-profit entity to
propagate technological advancements aimed at expediting drug discovery for the
public welfare, a logical alternative could involve a federal government-sponsored
initiative aimed at eliminating many of the diseases and infectious agents that
plague the human race. Unlike non-profit entities which are resource-poor, the
federal government could initiate and direct an initiative aimed at the production
of innovative pharmaceuticals by offering economic incentives to participants.
The concept of a government-sponsored research initiative is not far-fetched.
The Manhattan Project, which led to the development of the atomic bomb, is a
classic example of the government's ability to harness traditional, basic, academic
research for the development of a useful technology." This government
sponsored research initiative
had a clear central objective, a decisive test for success or failure,
leadership by technically competent hands-on scientists, access to
all discoverable intellectual property... budgets and facilities to
match requirements, overwhelming dedication to projects and none
to profit, an urgent time line, and a willingness and capability to
change directions quickly as new information required it.42
The Manhattan Project represented a pure collaboration between academic and
government research, as there was little influence from private industry.43
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical researchers rarely utilize this research model
today.'
3 Dalrymple, supra note 29, at 10; Pollack, supra note 32, at C2.
39 Daviss, supra note 33, at 42.
4Id.
41 Jed Sculy, The Virtual Professorsho: Intellectual Property Ownersho of Academic Work in a Digital
Era, 35 MCGEORGE L. REv. 227,241 (2004).
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United States Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist proposes a "Manhattan Project
for the 21st Century" to combat infectious disease and bioterrorism.4 5 Unlike its
predecessor, the Manhattan Project for the twenty-first century will not create a
destructive weapon but instead will defend against the destruction posed by
infectious diseases and bioterrorism.4 This proposal calls for an unprecedented
collaboration between government, academia, and industry predicated by
increases in support for basic research, biomedical education, and public health
infrastructure to generate novel therapeutics and vaccines, which could be rapidly
administered through vast distribution networks.47 This bold initiative would
require the detection, identification, and characterization of present and emerging
infectious agents, the development of appropriate therapeutics, including
vaccines, and the subsequent ability to timely manufacture, distribute, and
administer such therapeutics.
48
Along similar lines, President George W. Bush formulated the United States'
response to the increasing threat of an influenza pandemic in his plan entitled
"Pandemic Influenza Preparations and Response."49 This plan provides for a
tripartite approach to address the challenge of the evolving influenza virus, which
includes increased surveillance measures, establishment of an emergency response
plan, and development of novel vaccines and therapeutics."0 Specifically, the
President requested $3.6 billion to accelerate the development of new influenza
treatments and vaccines through increased collaborations among governmental,
academic, and industrial biomedical research entities.5 '
One of the greatest obstacles facing an initiative that attempts to pool the
research resources of government, academia, and private industry involves access
to technology and intellectual property. 2 Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Merck KGaA,"3 the only defense available to infringers performing biomedical
research for the public good was the experimental use defense.54 The
experimental use defense states that use of a patented invention "for the mere
purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of
" Frist, supra note 2.
46 Id.
8 Id.
" Bush, supra note 3.
50 Id.
51 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Safeguarding America Against Pandemic Influenza
(Nov. 1, 2005), availabk at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051101 html.
52 Anderson & Anderson, spra note 4, at 10.
5 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
s Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
2006]
7
Brignati: Access to the Safe Harbor: Bioterrorism, Influenza, and the Supre
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2006
J. INTELL PROP. L[
the specification" of the invention is not patent infringement." The applicability
of the experimental use defense appeared to turn on commercial intent.5 6 As a
result, the experimental use defense could not be utilized by profit-driven
biotechnology companies performing research for a government initiative.
The experimental use defense would likely also be unavailable to academic
research universities. The Federal Circuit excluded immunity for experimental use
of unlicensed patented inventions that are used "in furtherance of the alleged
infringer's legitimate business." 7  In Mady v. Duke University, the court
characterized a university as a business designed to attract students, and Duke's
unlicensed use of a patented laser was seen as an effort toward recruiting students,
as opposed to promoting education."
Given the unavailability of the experimental use defense, the safe harbor
created by the research exemption of the Hatch-Waxrnan Act could serve as a
means to protect governmental, academic, and industrial scientists who perform
research on patented inventions for the purposes of the Manhattan Project for
the twenty-first century or the Pandemic Influenza Preparations and Response
research initiatives.
This Note will examine the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Merck KGaA for the discovery and development of novel pharmaceuticals
through a collaborative research initiative. Part II will analyze the legislative
history and judicial interpretation of the safe harbor created by the research
exemption of the Hatch-Waxman Act, emphasizing the balance between
providing proper incentives to inventors and the public's interest in benefiting
from the technology. Part III will explore the recent decision by the Supreme
Court to effectively broaden the safe harbor, and the impact this interpretation
will have on drug discovery and collaborative research agreements aimed at
advancing the public welfare.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE PATENT DOCTRINE AND THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION
Article I of the United States Constitution states that, "Congress shall have
Power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
s Id. at 555.
56 See id.
s Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
s Id. at 1362.
[Vol. 13:375
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Writings and Discoveries." 9 Based on these Constitutional provisions, Congress
developed a patent protection system that encouraged invention by granting
exclusive rights to practice the patented invention while simultaneously furthering
the public welfare by disclosing and providing access to the inventions through
published patents." The exclusive rights imparted by. the grant of a patent
provide that anyone who "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into.the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the
patent."'" Patent exclusivity is granted for twenty years,62 which is considered an
adequate time to permit the recovery of investments in research and development
thus providing an incentive to invent.6 3
Although patent exclusivity promotes incentive-based progress of the useful
arts, technological progress may be stifled by patents that prevent subsequent
inventors from building upon patented technology during the patent term.'
Subsequent inventors could avoid patent infringement by entering into private
licensing agreements with the patent holders that would allocate profits and
balance incentives between the original inventor and subsequent user.6 However,
the transaction costs of such agreements are usually prohibitive. The
coordination of multiple licenses, the difficulty in arranging mutually acceptable
profit sharing regimes, and the possibility of anticompetitive refusals to license
and collusive licensing practices all act to inhibit agreements between patent
holders and subsequent inventors."
Realizing that experimentation is the only means toward technological
progress, the courts wrestled to balance the incentives for initial invention with
the progress that ensues from the further development of existing patented
technologies. In an attempt to alleviate the tension between these competing
policy considerations, the courts created an experimental use exemption to patent
infringement.67 In IW/hittemore v. Cutter,6s Justice Story originated the concept of
'9 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
o Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Saence: Exclusive Rights andExpeimental Use, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1023-24 (1989).
61 35 U.S.C. 271(a) (2000).
62 35 U.S.C. 154(a)(2) (2000).
6' Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Pubc Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Baain, 2004
WIs. L. REv. 81, 91.
' Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard P. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A
Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 REs. POL'Y 273 (1998).
65 Strandburg, supra note 63, at 92 (citing Nancy Gallini & Suzan Scotchmer, IntelkctualPrpery:
What is the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POL'Y AND THE ECON. 51, 69 (Adam B. Jaffe et
al. eds., 2002)).
6 Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 65, at 65, 67-69, 71-72.
67 See general4 Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent Infingement, 39 J. PAT. OFF.
2006]
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experimental use exemption in the alleged infringement of a machine that made
playing cards by stating, "it could never have been the intention of the legislature
to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to
produce its described effects."69 Justice Story elaborated on the experimental use
exemption in Sawin v. Guild,70 which involved a machine for the cutting of brad
nails, by stipulating that an infringing use must involve "an intent to use for
profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain
the verity and exactness of the specification. ' '7 ' Therefore, the test appeared to
turn on commercial intent, and the experimental use doctrine created a
dichotomy, which required classification of experiments as "for profit" or for
"philosophical experiments. ' '72
This dichotomy of the experimental use defense appears easy to apply:
research conducted by commercial entities are ineligible to claim this defense, but
basic, "academic," scientific research clearly falls under the scope of an
experimental use. However, the rapid development of scientific research has
fostered relationships between academic and commercial research.73  These
common relationships make it very difficult to delineate between the basic
research embodied within academic inquiry and research conducted with some
commercial expectation of future monetary gain.74 For instance, the court in
Embrex, Inc. v. Serice Engineering Cotp. involved a patent for vaccinating birds
against disease by injecting vaccines into a specific region of the egg prior to
hatching.75 The patent holder alleged that university professors, who were
attempting to work around the patent, infringed the patent.76 Despite the fact
that this basic research was conducted in an academic environment, the court
determined that the common law defense of experimental use was inapplicable
because the ultimate goal of the research was commercialization of an invention.7
SOC'Y 357 (1957) (discussing the history of the U.S. common law experimental use exemption).
68 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
69 Id at 1121.
70 Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 12,391).
71 Id. at 555.
72 Id; see also 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898
(1890).
7' Steve L. Bertha, Intellectual Propert Activities in U.S. Research Universities, 36 IDEA 513 (1996).
14 Gina C. Freschi, Comment, Navigating the Research Exemption's Safe Harbor Supreme Court to
Clarif Scope-Imph'cations for Stem Cell Research in Cahfornia, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 855, 862 (2005).
7' Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
76 Id. at 1346-47.
77 Id at 1349.
[Vol. 13:375
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In a separate opinion, Judge Radar concluded that the Patent Act did not provide
"room for... experimental use [as an] excuse[ ] for infringement." 8
Judge Radar's suggestion was arguably adopted in Madey v. Duke Universiy.79
Madey invented and patented a free-electron laser and was subsequently recruited
to Duke University to establish and direct a research laboratory that incorporated
this patented technology."0 Upon removal of Madey as laboratory director, Duke
continued to use Madey's patented laser technology in its teaching and research
laboratories.8 ' Madey sued for patent infringement, but Duke argued it was
entitled to a defense of experimental use because it was a university conducting
fundamental scientific research without a commercial intent.82 The court rejected
the profit versus philosophical inquiry dichotomy and instead examined whether
the use was "in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business." 3 The
court reasoned that the University's legitimate business was the education and
enlightenment of students and faculty, which serves to increase the status of the
institution and to lure funding, students and faculty."
If this reasoning is followed, 5 universities engaged in patent infringement will
likely be treated as commercial entities. Therefore, universities will now be forced
to enter into licensing agreements with patentees. This concept appears wholly
consistent with the spirit of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which permits U.S.
universities to own and manage inventions discovered using federal funds.86 Legal
scholars and scientists consider the Bayh-Dole Act as the foundation for
university technology transfer activities, resulting in increased licensing
agreements between universities and the private sector.8" Thus, if a university is
granted intellectual property rights in its inventions, reciprocal recognition of the
78 Id. at 1352.
79 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
0 Id
81 Id. at 1353.
82 Id. at 1356.
83 Id. at 1362 (holding that the manufacture and use of helicopter components for "[t]ests,
demonstrations, and experiments... [which] are in keeping with the legitimate business" for which
experimental use is not a defense) (citing Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
84 Id.
85 Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (denying Duke University's petition for certiorari).
' Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517,94 Stat.
3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. % 200-211 (2000)).
87 Bertha, supra note 73, at 513; seeJohn P. Walsh et al., Viewfrom the Bench: Patents andMateial
Tranfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002-03 (Sept. 2005) (analyzing the burdens of technology transfer
agreements in conducting research); see also Ted Agres, I'llSee You in Court, THE SCIENTIST, June 20,
2005, at 39 (acknowledging the legal challenges facing universities engaging in technology transfer);
Ned T. Himmelrich & Jonathan M. Holda, Technology Transfer Agreements: Don't Be an Amateur, 34
MN. B.J. 30 (2001) (discussing the legal issues underlying technology transfer agreements).
2006]
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intellectual property rights of others only seems fair. Consequently, recent
jurisprudence indicates that the common law experimental use defense is quite
limited.
B. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND ITS SAFE HARBOR
The experimental use defense has been invoked in situations that extend
beyond the context of experiments conducted for profit or for philosophical
inquiry. In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co., the experimental use
defense was raised to exempt pharmaceutical research activities performed to
determine the "sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects."88
Roche, the holder of a pharmaceutical patent for flurazepam hydrochloride, the
active ingredient in the sleep aid "Dalmane," sought to enjoin Bolar, a generic
drug manufacturer, from taking the required regulatory steps, during the life of
Roche's patent, to bring a drug equivalent to the patented brand name drug to
market.89 Essentially, Bolar was performing bioequivalency experiments, by
comparing the efficacy of their generic product to that of the patented drug,
which is a prerequisite for FDA regulatory approval.90 The purpose of the timing
of the testing was to expedite marketing of the generic drug so that it would be
available to the general public as soon as possible upon expiration of the patent
term.91 The court quickly dismissed the experimental use defense, as Bolar's
experimental use was solely for the furtherance of its legitimate business
interests.92  Although the court recognized that prohibition of such
experimentation would effectively grant an extension of the drug's patent term
until such studies were completed, the court ignored this argument and
categorically rejected an exemption for any experimental use that involved
"definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes."93
Following the Roche ruling, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act.94
' Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute,
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxnan) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000) (quoting Whittemore v.
Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600)).
89 Roche, 733 F.2d at 860.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 863 (citing Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. C1. 1976)).
93 Rocbe, 732 F.2d at 863.
94 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000)) (effectively
overruling Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.). The Act was sponsored by Senator Orin Hatch
and Congressman Henry Waxman. Id. See also Janice M. Mueller, No 'Dilettante Affair": Rethinking
[Vol. 13:375
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The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act is two-fold: to make available lower-
priced generic versions of drugs by establishing an abbreviated regulatory
approval process for generic drugs95 and to create new incentives to stimulate
expenditures on research and development with the intention to "develop
innovative and, ultimately, less costly treatment for diseases. 96 The Act attempts
to achieve these goals by striking a balance between the interests of generic and
innovative drug manufacturers.97
First, the Act creates an abbreviated approval process for generic drugs, which,
to the benefit of generic drug manufacturers, eliminates duplicative testing, such
as safety and effectiveness testing, previously required for FDA approval of
generic drugs."8 This benefit to generic drug manufacturers is offset by a patent
term restoration for innovative human and animal drugs, medical devices, and
food and color additives, which are all subject to regulatory delays associated with
pre-market government approval.9
Second, in order to temper the benefit of patent term restoration conferred
to innovative drug manufacturers, Congress also attempted to prevent the de
facto extension of an innovative drug's patent term indirectly due to the
regulatory delays encountered by generic drug manufacturers."t° This de facto
extension of the innovative drug's patent term is created by the inability of the
generic drug manufacturer to commence the necessary experimentation to gain
FDA approval until the expiration of the innovative drug patent.
Commencement of experimentation to gain regulatory compliance for a generic
drug prior to expiration of the innovative drug's patent term was considered an
infringing use.'' Therefore, the innovative drug patent holder retained a
monopoly on the market beyond the expiration of the patent, which lasted until
the generic manufacturer obtained FDA approval. Passage of section 202 of the
Hatch-Waxman Act sought to eliminate de facto patent term extensions by
establishing that "it shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent InfringementforBiomedicalResearch Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1,22-
27 (2001) (reviewing the legislative and judicial developments resulting in the enactment of the
Hatch-Waxman Act).
95 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(), at 14 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647.
96 Id. at 15, 20.
17 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 9, at 3.
91 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(), at 14-15.
'9 Id. at 15. Patent term restoration extends the life of patents to compensate patent holders for
marketing time lost while awaiting government approval. Id.
'00 Id. at 46.
101 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute,
Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000), as recognized
in Abbott Labs. v. Zenith Labs., 934 F. Supp. 925, 930-31 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a federal law which regulates the approval of
drugs."' 2  This clause has become known as a safe harbor from patent
infringement.
1 3
C. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE SCOPE OF THE SAFE HARBOR
The existence of the safe harbor is largely attributable to two phrases:
"patented invention" and "reasonably related."'" The interpretation of these
phrases has greatly contributed to the controversy surrounding the scope of the
safe harbor. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the safe harbor to
patented inventions that include medical devices in Eli Lily & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc.1°' The Court held that Medtronic's use of Eli Lilly's patented implantable
cardiac defibrillator technology was not infringement because its use was related
to obtaining FDA approval for a generic substitute, which was to be sold
commercially upon expiration of the patent.' °6 The Court evaluated the language
of § 271 (e)(1) in the context of the entire Hatch-Waxman Act, and reached the
conclusion that the patent term restoration and the patent infringement
provisions encompass "a single legislative package.'107 Therefore, if a patented
invention is eligible for the benefits of the patent term restoration aimed to
compensate for delays at the beginning of the patent term, the invention must
also be subject to the offset of the infringement exemption that is intended to
alleviate the anticompetitive restriction at the end of the patent term.' °8 Thus, the
scope of § 271(e)(1) encompasses not only drugs, but also applies to medical
devices.
After finding that the safe harbor is applicable to medical devices, the courts
were next faced with defining the kinds of activities that may be "reasonably
related" to FDA approval. In a similar medical device case involving an
implantable defibrillator, the court in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. was required
to evaluate whether activities, such as the manufacturing of the defibrillator, its
sale to hospitals, and its demonstration at trade shows, were reasonably related to
162 H.R. REP. No. 98-857(1), at 45 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 5 271(e)(1)(2000)). See 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); supra text accompanying note 11.
103 See, e.g., Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 864 (Fed. Cit. 2003), rev'd,
125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
104 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1).
105 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
'06 Id at 666-74.
107 Id. at 670 n.3.
108 Id. at 672-73.
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obtaining FDA approval. 9 The court held that all of these activities were
reasonably related to clinical trials, which are necessary for FDA approval of the
medical device."0
The court noted the congressional acknowledgment that parties seeking FDA
approval will not always know what types of information or the quantity thereof
are required to gain approval.' Based on this fluid standard, the court
recognized Congress' justification for the phrase "reasonably related" and
subsequently interpreted it to encompass "latitude in making judgments about the
nature and extent of the otherwise infringing activities they would engage in as
they sought to develop information to satisfy the FDA.""' 2 Consistent with this
latitude, the court determined that the exemption should not be lost because
some of the party's infringing uses fail to generate data of interest to the FDA or
generated more data than was necessary to secure FDA approval." 3 The test
forged by this court is whether it would have been objectively reasonable that the
infringing use in question would contribute to the generation of the kinds of
information that would likely be relevant in gaining FDA regulatory approval."4
In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., a Massachusetts district court
utilized the test set forth in Intermedics"' to apply the safe harbor research
exemption to preclinical drug discovery activities." 6 Amgen alleged that Hoechst
infringed Amgen's patent for a recombinant form of erythropoietin (EPO), a
hormone involved in the production of red blood cells. Hoechst used Amgen's
patented EPO during their development and manufacture of a competing
product, GA-EPO." 7 The court held that Hoechst's export and extensive use of
the patented EPO were all activities encompassed by the patent infringement safe
harbor created by § 271(e)(1)." 8 This court adopted the objective test set forth
in Intermedics emphasizing that an exempted use must be reasonably related to
FDA approval, but need not be exclusively for the purpose of obtaining FDA
approval."9 Thus, an exempted use, such as preclinical functional analyses or
clinical human trials, may be related to FDA approval, but could "be conducted
'0 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
110 Id at 1282-88.
... Id. at 1280.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1280-81.
115 Id.
116 Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).
117 Id. at 106. Hoechst used the GA-EPO as a standard reference for studies on alternative
manufacturing processes, purity and consistency testing, and for virus clearance experimentation.
Id.
118 Id. at 109-12.
119 Id. at 107-08.
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for purposes other than, or in addition to, obtaining FDA approval... [because]
ulterior motives or alternate purposes do not preclude application of the section
271 (6)(1) exemption. ' '120
Following theAmgen decision, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. brought suit against
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Inc. for infringement upon a process patent for preparing
the drug taxol,12 1 an anti-cancer drug. 22 Bristol-Myers used patented chemical
intermediates derived from the taxol synthesis, which were claimed in the Rhone-
Poulenc patent, for the development of novel anti-cancer drugs that would
replace taxol on the market."2 Based on a detailed factual analysis and application
of the Intermedics test, the court determined that it was objectively reasonable that
Bristol-Myers believed that there was a "decent prospect" that experimentation
with Rhone-Poulenc's intermediates would generate information that was likely
to be relevant to the FDA regulatory approval process.'24 Therefore, Bristol-
Myers's experimentation with Rhone-Poulenc's patented intermediates were
entitled to exemption under § 271(e)(1).' The court reasoned that although
Bristol-Myers's use of the patented intermediates in preliminary research may not
generate data that could be directly submitted to the FDA, this use could be
reasonably related to FDA regulatory approval providing the information was
generated to determine if regulatory approval would be sought, or if the use
relates to a preliminary research activity that could facilitate the generation of
information that would be submitted to the FDA.'26 Furthermore, the exemption
of§ 271 (e)(1) must apply to all activities reasonably related to a potential or actual
FDA application, beginning with the initial synthesis of a pharmaceutical
candidate. 2 7 If selection of a candidate drug or filing of an FDA application was
a prerequisite for protection by the statutory exemption of § 271(e)(1), the
exemption would never apply because the preliminary research and development
necessary for FDA approval could never have been undertaken.1
2 8
120 Id.
121 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833(RPP), 2001 WL
1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
122 Id. at *4.
123 I d
124 Id. at *6 (quoting Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal.
1991)).
125 Bistol-Myers Squibb Co., 2001 WL 1512597, at *6.
126 Id. at *7. This is consistent with the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) which states,
"[a] party which develops such information, but decides not to submit an application for approval
is protected as long as the development was done to determine whether or not an application for





Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol13/iss2/4
SAFE HARBOR
Following the lead of the Amgen and the Bristol-Myers Squibb holdings, a
Delaware district court also adopted the expansive view of the scope of the safe
harbor in Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCl Cop.1 29 In developing magneticabased
cell separating technology for FDA approval, AmCell allegedly infringed Nexell's
patented CD34 antibodies, which are used for isolation of stem cells from blood,
by actively recruiting physicians to participate in clinical trials to evaluate the
CD34-based cell-sorting technology. 3 ° Although AmCell's activities could be
construed as a marketing endeavor, the court stated that these allegedly infringing
activities were conducted in an effort to solicit physicians to participate in clinical
trials aimed at gaining FDA regulatory approval.' Therefore, AmCell's research
activities were reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval and fall within the
scope of the research exemption of § 271(e) (1).132
Examination of the Amgen, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Nexell cases indicates a
judicial preference for a broad interpretation of the safe harbor for patent
infringement. The courts have consistently adopted an expansive view of the
research exemption, because to hold otherwise would be contrary to legislative
intent by "chill[ing] parties from engaging in the very pre-approval testing that
Congress sought to encourage.'
133
D. MERCK KGAA V. INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD.
Integra LifeSciences and the Burnham Institute own five patents,134 all of
which are related to the fibronectin-derived RGD peptide, a tri-peptide sequence
of the amino acids Arginine, Glycine, and Aspartic Acid (abbreviated in single
letter notation R, G, D, respectively).3 The RGD peptide promotes cell
adhesion by interacting with integrin C0j3 3.'36 Integrin-mediated cell adhesion
plays a critical role in wound healing, biocompatibility of prosthetic devices, and
angiogenesis-the process of blood vessel growth.
37
129 Nexell Therapeutics, Inc. v. AmCell Corp., 199 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Del. 2002).
130 Id. at 199.
131 Id. at 204.
132 Id; seeAbtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that if an activity
is reasonably related to gaining FDA approval, the underlying purposes or consequences of the
activity are irrelevant to the applicability of the statutory exemption).
133 Nexdl Therapeutics, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
134 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2377 (2005).
13s U.S. Patent No. 5,695,997 (filed June 2,1995) (issued Dec. 9,1997); U.S. Patent No. 4,988,621
(filed Dec. 10, 1987) (issued Jan. 29, 1991); U.S. Patent No. 4,879,237 (filed May 24, 1985) (issued
Nov. 7, 1989); U.S. Patent No. 4,792,525 (filed June 17, 1985) (issued Dec. 20, 1988); U.S. Patent
No. 4,789,734 (filed Aug. 6, 1985) (issued Dec. 6, 1988).
136 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2377.
137 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S.
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Dr. David Cheresh, a scientist at the Scripps Research Institute (Scripps),
discovered that blocking 0c 3 integrin receptors inhibited angiogenesis.
138
Angiogenesis is a process integral to many diseases, such as solid tumor cancers,
diabetic retinopathy, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, and inflammatory bowel
disease. 39 Dr. Cheresh demonstrated the tumor growth in chicken embryos
could be reversed using either a monoclonal antibody that he developed himself
or a patented cyclic RGD peptide (EMD 66203) provided by Integra.1"
Recognizing the importance of Cheresh's discovery, Merck provided funding for
angiogenesis research conducted by Dr. Cheresh at Scripps' to finance the
"'necessary experiments to satisfy the biological bases and regulatory (FDA)
requirements for the implementation of clinical trials' with EMD 66203 or a
derivative thereof."'42
Research performed at Scripps led to the identification of two derivatives of
the RGD peptide EMD 66203: EMD 85189 and EMD 121974.143 In a
subsequent research agreement, Scripps agreed to initiate in itm'" and in vivo
14 s
studies of the RGD peptides necessary for an IND while Merck pledged an
additional six million dollars towards this project and agreed to perform the
toxicology tests necessary for FDA approval of clinical trials.' 46
Pursuant to the agreement, Dr. Cheresh directed experimentation " 'to
evaluate the specificity, efficacy, and toxicity of EMD 66203, 85189, and 121974
for various diseases, to explain the mechanism by which these drug candidates
work, and to determine which candidates were effective and safe enough to
warrant testing in humans.' -147 Specifically, these tests assayed the mechanism
of action and pharmokinetics of candidate drugs, including histopathology,
toxicology, circulation, diffusion and half-life of the peptides in the
Ct. 2372 (2005).
131 Id. at 863.
139 id
140 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2378.
141 Id. at 2377.
142 Integra DfeSdences I, Lid, 331 F.3d at 863.
143 Id.
" In vitro literally means "in glass," but generally encompasses things outside the living body and
in an artificial environment. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 659 (11 th ed. 2003).
14' In viva literally means "in the living" and applies to things in the living body of an animal or
plant. Id.
146 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2378; see 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2005) (stating the requirements for
an investigational new drug application).
147 IntegraLifeSdencesI, lid, 331 F.3d at 863 (quoting Brief for Defedant-Appellant Merck KGaA,
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bloodstream.'48 In addition, experiments were also performed to evaluate the
proper mode of administration of the peptides for optimum therapeutic effect.
149
Similar experiments were also performed on LM609, the monoclonal antibody
developed by Dr. Cheresh that was also capable of inhibiting angiogenesis, and
organic mimetics, which were thought to block C&Av3integrins in a similar manner
to RGD peptides."' In regards to experimentation involving the monoclonal
antibody or organic mimetics, the RGD peptides were used as a positive control,
a measure for the efficacy of the experimental antibody or mimetics.'' Based on
the results of these experiments, Scripps determined that EMD 121974, a
derivative of the Integra peptide, was the most promising angiogenesis inhibitor
candidate for testing in humans.'5
2
Upon learning of the Scripps-Merck agreement and believing that the
angiogenesis research was a commercial project that infringed its patents, Integra
offered Merck licenses to the RGD patents, which Merck declined.'1
3
Consequently, Integra, along with the Burnham Institute, filed a patent
infringement suit against Merck, Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh in the Southern
District of California."s  Merck answered that its research performed in
collaboration with Scripps and Dr. Cheresh fell under the safe harbor created by
§ 271 (e)(1).155
The jury found that Scripps and Dr. Cheresh infringed Integra's patents and
awarded Integra a reasonable royalty of fifteen million dollars. 156 Merck appealed
the jury verdict of patent infringement to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the
district court's holding that the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) did not apply because
"the Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not clinical testing to supply
148 Id.
149 Id
11o Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2378-79.
151 Id. at 2379. Scripps licensed the patent for the LM609 monoclonal antibody to Ixsys, a
California biotechnology company. Id. at 2379 n.4. Ixsys collaborated with Dr. Cheresh and Scripps
to submit an investigational new drug application for a humanized version of the LM609 antibody,
called Vitaxin. Id This application included data collected from Dr. Cheresh's in vitro and in i'o
experiments concerning the antibody's mechanism of action and efficacy as an inhibitor of
angiogenesis. Id.
112 Id at 2378.
153 Integra LifeSences I, Lid, 331 F.3d at 863.
1 4 Id. at 862.
155 Id.
156 I d The Federal Circuit did not believe that the jury award of fifteen million dollars was
supported by substantial evidence and held that the amount awarded seemed excessive when
considering the scientific and marketing uncertainties of the technology involved. Id at 871-72. On
remand, the District Court reduced the damages award to approximately six million dollars. Integra
LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, No. CV.96 CV 1307-B(AJB), 2004 WL 2284001, at *11 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 7, 2004).
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information to the FDA, but only general biomedical research to identify new
pharmaceutical compounds.') 5 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the construction
of § 271(e)(1).' Through examination of the text of § 271(e)(1), the Court
determined that the statute clearly provided a "wide berth for the use of patented
drugs in activities related to the federal regulatory process."' 9 The Court held
that § 271 (e) (1)'s safe harbor from patent infringement encompassed all uses of
patented inventions that are reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval, which
necessarily includes preclinical studies."W The Court did not agree with the
Federal Circuit's limitation of the safe harbor to research conducted in clinical
trials. 1" Since an IND must be filed with the FDA prior to the initiation of
clinical trials, the IND represents a required regulatory step in gaining FDA
approval.'62 Therefore, the Court concluded that research pertaining to preclinical
studies should be included within the safe harbor of§ 271 (e)(1). 63 The Court also
believed that § 271 (e)(1) provided adequate space for the successes and failures
of experimentation associated with drug development and associated regulatory
approval."6 Considering that scientific inquiry is a process of trial and error, the
Court held that § 271(e)(1)'s safe harbor also extends to "experimentation on
drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission... [and to] use
of patented compounds in experiments that are not ultimately submitted to the
FDA.' 61 Provided that a drug developer has a reasonable basis for believing that
research conducted on a patented compound could lead to an FDA submission,
such uses should be exempted from patent infringement under the § 271 (e)(1)
regardless of whether the drug candidate is ever the subject of an FDA
submission or the experimentation is ever included in an FDA application. 166 The
Court justified the extension of the safe harbor to such research activities through
the "reasonably related" requirement by deducing that the relationship between
the experimental use of a patented compound and the submission of experimental
"' Integra LifeSciences I, Lid., 331 F.3d at 866.
18 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (granting certiorari); Merck
KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005) ('We granted certiorari to review
the Court of Appeals' Construction of § 271(e)(1).'".
159 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2380.
160 Id
161 Id (citing Integra LfeSdences I, Lid., 331 F.3d at 866).
162 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2381.
163 Id at 2380-82.
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data to the FDA does not become less reasonable or more attenuated because the
data is omitted from an FDA application.'67
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSdences I, Ltd.
should facilitate investment in research and development of vaccines and
therapeutics designed to combat the threats of bioterrorism and infectious
disease, thus expediting drug discovery process by providing access to technology.
The Merck KGaA decision represents the most recent judicial attempt to balance
the property rights embodied in a patent against the availability of technology to
promote the progress of science. In attempting to fulfill the congressional intent
underlying the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Merck KGaA decision
adopted an approach to patent law that favors access to technology so as to
stimulate innovative drug discovery. Considering that the common law
experimental use defense is unavailable, the safe harbor created by the research
exemption in the Hatch-Waxman Act, as interpreted by the Court in Merck KGaA,
will have the net effect of expediting drug discovery by providing access to
technology and will simultaneously foster research collaborations while driving
competition. Although the Court's interpretation of§ 271 (e)(1)'s safe harbor will
have ramifications on drug discovery, the perceived value of patents, and
approaches to patent licensing, a balance will be maintained.
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAFE HARBOR ON GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
RESEARCH COLLABORATIONS
Experimentation is the core of scientific inquiry. Effective and innovative
scientific research requires broad access to patented technology and the freedom
to use such technology to formulate and test hypotheses. 6 Critics of intellectual
property law contend that patents, such as those involved in drug discovery, can
stifle research and innovation.'69 Despite providing incentives for innovation,
patent exclusivity can slow technological advancement by restricting the use of a
patented invention.7 0 The incentive of a monopoly chills maximal, and perhaps
optimal, use of the technology for the development of novel drugs, which would
167 Id.
"6 Strandburg, supra note 63, at 82.
169 Eric K Steffe & TimothyJ. Shea,Jr., Drug Discover Tooli and/he CinicalResearh Exemptionfrom
Patent Infringement, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 369, 373 (2003).
170 Strandburg, supra note 63, at 91.
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be a benefit to society.' The stifling effect of patent exclusivity is compounded
by the fact that the experimental use exemption is rarely available. 17 2 In fact, the
decision by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Mady v. Duke University,
1 3
which strictly limited the experimental use exemption, has been criticized for
"undermin[ing] the balance between innovation and access that lies at the heart
of the Patent Act.' 4 Similar to its holding in Mady, the Federal Circuit in Integra
DifeSdences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA believed that the safe harbor from patent
infringement should be narrowly construed, 7 1 further limiting access to patented
technologies.
1. Access to Technology. In Merck KGaA v. Integra LDfeSciences I Ltd., the Supreme
Court adopted a broad interpretation of the safe harbor from patent infringement
as prescribed by § 271 (e)(1), which is consistent with precedent from Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. 76 The Supreme Court held that § 271 (e)(1)'s safe harbor
"extend[ed] to all uses of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the
development and submission of any information" to the FDA, which necessarily
includes both preclinical and clinical research. 7  The Supreme Court's broad
interpretation of the safe harbor to extend to early research activities, such as
preclinical studies, will promote innovative research aimed at combating
bioterrorism and infectious disease by granting scientists increased freedom to
operate.
Since preclinical research reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval will
be considered exempt from patent infringement, researchers developing
bioterrorism-related and infectious disease-related therapeutics and vaccines will
have advanced access to use patented technologies prior to the expiration of the
patent term. Increased access to patented technologies will necessarily expedite
the evaluation and analysis of potential drug and vaccine candidates, achieving an
integral goal of these broad-based research collaborations. Therefore, the
availability of a broad safe harbor will putatively accelerate the drug and discovery
process through government-sponsored initiatives, resulting in the development
1 Id at 123.
7 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); Sawin v.
Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No 12,391); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351,
1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
"I Made, 307 F.3d at 1351.
174 Tom Saunders, Case Comment, Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Mady and the Future of
the Experimental Use Doctine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 262 (2003).
175 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 866-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125
S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
176 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (adopting a similarly broad
interpretation of the safe harbor).
177 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005).
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of novel, safer, and more effective drugs targeting the threat of infectious disease
and bioterrorism 
7 8
2. Impact on Licensing. In its evaluation of damages, the Federal Circuit in
Integra LDfeSdences acknowledged the cumulative costs, both financial and
transactional, of gaining access to the requisite number of patents, through
licensing, to develop a drug.179 However, the Supreme Court's express extension
of the safe harbor from patent infringement to encompass both preclinical and
clinical research"s will likely have dramatic effects on licensing behaviors.
From the perspective of scientists collaborating in a government-based
research initiative, the breadth of the safe harbor to include preclinical research
activities will greatly reduce the costs associated with development of novel
vaccines and pharmaceuticals. Successful vaccine and pharmaceutical research
hinges on the ability to access existing patented technologies.' 8' In the case of
these government-sponsored research initiatives, almost every experiment
performed is reasonably related to gaining FDA approval. 2 Therefore, a
research entity participating in such a government-sponsored collaboration will
necessarily avoid the high costs associated with acquiring numerous licenses to
engage in drug and vaccine discovery. In addition, collaborative researchers will
also avoid the phenomenon of the "anticommons,' '18 3 characterized by the
occasional resistance of patentees who refuse to license their technologies, thereby
completely obstructing research initiatives. The advantage of reduced
transactional costs gained by researchers engaging in government-sponsored
research initiatives is offset by two things. First, researchers lose the revenues
they might derive from licensing their technology to research entities pursuing
similar research goals."' Second, researchers are unable to thwart competitors'
research by denying access to their patented technology.' However, this trade-
off is of little consequence to participants in a government-based research
initiative because the goal of such initiatives is scientific progress as opposed to
successful competition in the marketplace. Therefore, a reduction in transaction
178 See Brief for Eli Lilly & Co. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Merck KGaA v.
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), available at 2005 WL 435888
(arguing that the Federal Circuit's narrow interpretation of the safe harbor from patent infringement
would delay drug discovery).
179 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 870-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
0 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005).
181 Kyla Dunn, A Look at... Patents & Biotech, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2000, at B3.
182 Brief for Eli Lilly & Co. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Merck KGaA v.
Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), availabk at 2005 WL 435888.
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costs should decrease the cost of drug discovery while simultaneously stimulating
advancements in innovations by increasing access to technology.
Expansion of the safe harbor will also likely have a profound effect on the
licensing behaviors of universities and research institutions, who will likely be
major players in any government-sponsored research initiative. Collectively, U.S.
universities, hospitals, and research institutions earned in excess of one billion
dollars in licensing fees in fiscal year 2003.186 Generation of this revenue is largely
attributable to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which allowed universities to retain
title to discoveries made using federal funds.' Based on these figures,
universities and research institutes stand to lose substantial revenues as a result
of their decreasing ability to license their patented technology.
The majority of research universities and institutes operate on a non-profit
basis.' Consistent with the underlying principles of a: government-sponsored
research initiative, the fundamental mission of research universities is the creation
and dissemination of knowledge for the benefit of society, resulting in an
emphasis on teaching, publishing, and furthering research performed at the
university." In addition to the monetary benefits of a successful technology
transfer program, research universities also engage in licensing agreements to
enhance the reputation of their institution. Although some commentators have
asserted that "[u]niversities are sophisticated players in biomedical research,"' 9 °
research universities inherently lack the resources to develop, manufacture, and
eventually profit from innovative drug discovery. Rarely do university scientists
engage in research that would require purchasing patent licenses.' First,
academic research is usually basic research, aimed at answering scientific questions
in an effort to generate knowledge, as opposed to the applied research performed
by industrial entities, which is aimed at solving practical problems in hopes of
186 Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, UTM LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2003 (2004); Tao Huang,
Note, The ExperimentalPmpose Doctrine andBiomedicalResearch, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. &TECH. L. REV.
97, 108-09 (2004), availabk at http://www.mttlr.org/voleleven/huang.pdf.
187 35 U.S.C. % 200-211 (2000); see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE
1018, 1018 (2003) ("[U]niversities have become players in the patent system in a way that could
hardly have been imagined before the Bayh-Dole Act. Universities owned 1.1% of U.S. corporate-
owned patents issued between 1969 and 1986; by 1999 that number had risen to 4.8%.").
188 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958
(2003); see generaly Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States
Patent Infi'ngement Liabi'v: Imp'cationsfor University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR
L. REV. 917 (2004).
9 See, e.g., Bertha, supra note 73, at 525.
190 Huang, supra note 186, at 109.
191 See general# Bertha, supra note 73 (indicating that research universities are more inclined to
grant licenses to industrial companies than to purchase similar licenses).
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commercial gai. 192 Second, basic academic research usually has little prospect for
economic gain.193 Given the limitations of funding for university-based research,
it would not be economically reasonable to purchase access to technology,-that
would not pay for itself. Given their propensity to perform basic scientific
research, research universities would not likely benefit as significantly as more
sophisticated research entities that participate in a government-sponsored
research initiative from an increase in access to the applied technology embodied
in patents.
This conclusion operates under the assumption that research universities will
continue to conduct basic scientific research. However, academic attitudes
toward applied research may change following the Court's decision in Merck
KGaA. Considering that the decision in Merck KGaA nearly eliminates the need
to license technology, academic scientists and non-profit institutions may be
economically induced to perform applied research, which by its nature has a
greater chance of realizing an economic gain. Performance of applied research
is certainly compatible with academic institutional philosophy of creating and
disseminating knowledge for the benefit of society.1 94 Academic researchers
would have equal access to patented technologies, providing that they are used in
a manner reasonably related with generating information for FDA approval.
Furthermore, university-sponsored applied research would bolster the reputation
of the university as an innovative center of learning with a firm commitment to
serving the general public.
Assuming a continued absence of the resources necessary to manufacture and
distribute pharmaceuticals, universities would still be required to interact and
enter into agreements with private industry so that applied technologies could be
manufactured and sold. It is unclear, however, when or how such agreements
should be negotiated, considering the opportunity for free access following
disclosure in the patent. Regardless, if academia switches to performing applied
research, a shift in revenue-generating research activities would also likely occur,
with universities and research institutions engaging in a reduced level of licensing
agreements following disclosure of the patent and entering into more agreements
prior to disclosure of the invention. This trend seemingly could slow the
dissemination of scientific knowledge; however, reciprocal gains in efficiency
would result as the agreements that are negotiated involve technology that is
reasonably related to an FDA application as opposed to more primitive patented
technology that has a tenuous possibility of development of an effective
pharmaceutical.
192 Dalryrnple, supra note 29, at 10.
193 Bertha, supra note 73, at 515.
'94 Id. at 514.
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3. The Question of Research Tools. One unanswered licensing question remaining
after the Merck KGaA decision is whether § 271 (e)(1)'s safe harbor extends to
patents that involve research tools. 9 5 A research tool is "a product or method
whose purpose is use in the conduct of research."' 96 The Working Group on
Research Tools at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines a research tool
as "embrac[ing] the full range of resources that scientists use in the laboratory,"
including "cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth
factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and
cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines,
databases and computer software."' 97 The controversy surrounding patented
research tools is that the tool itself would not be the subject of an application to
the FDA, but instead it is the technological progress resulting from use of the
research tool that would be the subject of such an application.'9 8 Therefore, the
case law does not clarify whether the safe harbor would extend to an indirect use
of a patented technology in generating the information necessary for an FDA
submission. This issue remains murky, as the Court expressly declined to resolve
the issue in Merck KGaA.'99
Considering that the Merck KGaA decision will decrease the incidence of
licensing costs and simultaneously increase the access to patented technology, an
efficient allocation of government resources should result. In the absence of
burdensome licensing fees, participants in a collaborative, government-sponsored
research initiative will be free to utilize their funding on the development of
technology as opposed to first paying for access to the technology and then
engaging in experimentation. The research, which is the essence of the research
initiative, will serve as the primary expenditure for researchers attempting to
remedy the ills of bioterrorism and infectious disease.
'9 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2382 n.7 (2005).
196 Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 (Fed. Cit. 2003) (Newman,
J., dissenting).
197 NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
(NIH) WORKING GRouP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (une 4, 1998), available at http://www.nih.gov/
news/researchtools/index.htm; see also Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research
Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final
Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090,72,092 n.1 (Dec. 23,1999) (stating that research tools "embrace the full
range of tools that scientists use in the laboratory, including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies,
reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and
cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines").
198 Strandburg, supra note 63, at 123.
199 Merck KGaA, 125 S. Ct. at 2382 n.7.
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B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAFE HARBOR ON THE VALUATION OF PATENTS
Interpretation of § 271 (e)(1)'s safe harbor in a manner that favors the societal
benefits of accelerated drug discovery suggests that the Supreme Court's decision
in Merck KGaA prefers access to technology over strong patent rights."' An
expansion in the scope of the research exemption afforded by the safe harbor
would logically result in a decrease in the perceived value of patents related to
drug and vaccine development.20 ' The safe harbor would effectively limit a patent
holder's right of exclusivity. The inability of a patent holder to exclude others
from using his invention denies the patent holder of the incentive offered in the
form of a patent monopoly. If a patent can be readily infringed in the course of
obtaining FDA regulatory approval, the economic incentives associated with
exclusivity, namely the ability to recover costs, will be reduced.2 2
Reduction in the incentives associated with patents could arguably hinder drug
research and development, as research entities may decide to channel capital away
from drug research and development and into resources more likely to generate
a return on their investment. However, patent valuation cannot be examined in
a vacuum. Although an individual patent's right to exclusivity may be limited, the
same is true for all patents whose use could be reasonably related to generating
information for an FDA submission. Therefore, the right of exclusivity is equally
extinguished from all drug-related patents. This loss of exclusivity is not
uncompensated because what the patent holder loses in exclusivity, the patent
holder gains in increased access to technology. This access to technology will
almost certainly extend to patented technologies directly related to and in
competition with the patent holder's patented technology. This trade-off will
afford a patent holder the opportunity to utilize other existing patented
technologies to build upon and improve the patent holder's patented technology.
This gain-loss rationale operates under the assumption of a tacit reciprocal
agreement: one who gains, also loses. This rationale fails to consider the concept
of the "free rider,"2"3 who gains access to patented technology without
contributing to the body of patented technology through a loss of exclusivity of
his own. Two kinds of free riders likely exist: generic pharmaceutical developers
and innovative drug developers. In the case of generic drug developers, the
access to technology gained through the § 271 (e)(1)'s safe harbor is limited by the
o See id. at 2383-84 (protecting the use of patented compounds in preclinical studies).
201 Freschi, supra note 74, at 893.
202 Brief for Invitrogen Corp. et al. as Amid Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3-4, Merck
KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237), available at 2005 WL
682093, at *3-*4.
203 Strandburg, supra note 63, at 111.
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patent itself. Although a generic drug developer may use technology reasonably
related to the generation of information for FDA approval, once approval is
acquired the generic drug developer is prevented from bringing the generic
equivalent of the patented technology to market until the expiration of the patent
term. Therefore, although generic developers gain access to the technology, they
are unable to profit from such gains until expiration of the underlying
technology's patent. Free riding, innovative drug developers are capable of
patenting novel technology and entering the marketplace, pending FDA
regulatory approval prior to expiration of the underlying patent. Once the patent
is issued, however, others may now access that developer's technology provided
the "reasonably related" standard is met.
A critical assumption regarding expansion of the safe harbor and its negative
affects on the valuation of patents is that access to technology is synonymous
with the practice of technology. Access to technology does not necessarily
indicate that the technology can be practiced. Although the enablement
requirement of the Patent Act compels the inventor to disclose how to make and
use the invention,2 an inherent difficulty exists in translating scientific discovery
into written expression."' This difficulty is embodied by the doctrine of
equivalents, which expands the scope of infringement beyond the literal language
of the patent claims to compensate for the difficulty in articulating scientific
phenomenon in words.2 6 The enablement requirement also acknowledges the
limitations of written expression, upholding a patent specification that requires
some experimentation to enable the practice of the patented technology, provided
that the amount of experimentation required is not "undue."2 7 Since biomedical
patents rarely facilitate the immediate practice of technology, expansion of the
safe harbor to allow others to use patented technology actually provides an
incentive to disclose the absolute minimum amount of information when applying
for a patent in an effort to confuse the competition.
The perception of a decreased value of patents or an increased number of free
riders as a result of a broad interpretation of the safe harbor from patent
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
20 Strandburg, supra note 63, at 102.
o See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731-32 (2002).
207 In n Wands, 858 F.2d 731,737 (Fed. Cit. 1988) (citing ExParte Forman, 1986 WL 83597,230
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 546, 547 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986)).
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infringement may result in a decrease in patented inventions. Unlike the
alternative investment rationale offered above, innovative drug manufacturers
may elect for an alternative form of intellectual property protection, namely trade
secrets, in the absence of meaningful patent protection.208 An increase in trade
secrets would result in a reduction of public dissemination of research
information, which would subsequently suppress innovation.
Since technology protected by trade secret is capable of gaining FDA
approval,2" an immediate solution to avoid the inhibition of innovation associated
with trade secrets is not available. However, the transaction costs associated with
utilizing and maintaining trade secret protection may be prohibitive.
Trade secret protection is not likely a viable means to protect the intellectual
property of research entities engaged in a collaborative, government-sponsored
research initiative. Conceptually, creation and maintenance of trade secrets are
contrary to the spirit of the research initiative, which places the advancement and
dissemination of scientific knowledge for the public good ahead of the private
control and exploitation of technology. In addition, trade secret protection is
likely impossible when considering the process for obtaining funding for
government-sponsored research. Specifically, application and retention of
government funding usually requires submission of a research proposal followed
by subsequent progress reports, which are both readily available to the public.210
Therefore, maintenance of a trade secret that involves data generated by
government funding is not feasible.
Steffe & Shea, supra note 169, at 374.
A trade secret is information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 [2] (2005) (quoting UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1 (1973)).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000); Roberta Schugmann & Leslie Shaw, TheAppfication of Trade Secret
Protection to Safety and Effectiveness Data of Patented Drugs, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 463, 475 (1983); see
Barry Meier, F.D.A. Will Not Rekase Some Data on Heart Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at C3(discussing FDA's refusal to release information on frequency and cause of heart device failure in
response to Freedom of Information Act request, claiming such information exempted as "a
corporate trade secret").
210 Thomas 0. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Merck KGaA v. Integra LDfeSciences I, Ltd.
broadly interpreted § 271(e)(1)'s safe harbor from patent infringement to
encompass the use of patented inventions that are reasonably related to obtaining
FDA approval.2 1 1 This interpretation is wholly consistent with the legislative
intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act,2 1 2 which attempted to stimulate the
development of innovative treatments for diseases. The Merck KGaA decision
will foster a research environment amenable to government-sponsored research
initiatives, such as those proposed to combat the threats of bioterrorism and
infectious disease. Through increased access to patented technology,
government-sponsored research initiatives are poised to make great strides in the
development of innovative vaccines and therapeutics aimed at protecting the
general public from the global threats of bioterrorism and infectious disease.
MICHAELJ. BRIGNATI, PH.D.
211 Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeScience I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2732, 2782 (2005).
212 See Drug Price Competition and PatentTerm Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman) of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 1984 Stat. 1538.
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